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Education researchers and policy makers agree that teachers differ in terms of quality and that
quality matters for student achievement. Despite prodigious amounts of research, however, debate
still persists about the causal relationship between specific teacher credentials and student
achievement. In this paper, we use a rich administrative data set from North Carolina to explore a
range of questions related to the relationship between teacher characteristics and credentials on the
one hand and student achievement on the other. Though the basic questions underlying this research
are not new - and, indeed, have been explored in many papers over the years within the rubric of the
"education production function" - the availability of data on all teachers and students in North
Carolina over a ten-year period allows us to explore them in more detail and with far more
confidence than has been possible in previous studies. We conclude that a teacher's experience, test
scores and regular licensure all have positive effects on student achievement, with larger effects for
math than for reading. Taken together the various teacher credentials exhibit quite large effects on
math achievement, whether compared to the effects of changes in class size or to the
socio-economics characteristics of students, as measured, for example, by the education level of
their parents.
Charles T. Clotfelter


















Education researchers and policy makers agree that teachers differ in terms of 
quality and that quality matters for student achievement. The problem is that it is difficult 
to measure teacher quality. One strategy used in a number of recent empirical studies is to 
use teacher fixed effects in an equation explaining variation in student achievement.  The 
variation in these estimated fixed effects is then interpreted as the variation in teacher 
“quality.” Emerging from such studies is the general consensus that a one standard 
deviation difference in the quality of teachers as measured in this way generates about a 
0.10 standard deviation in achievement in math and a slightly smaller effect in reading. 
(Rivkin, Hanushek and Kain, 2005;  Rockoff  2004, and Aronson, Barrow and Sanders, 
2003). Of more direct interest for policy makers, however, would be knowledge about 
which specific characteristics or credentials of teachers are most predictive of student 
achievement.  Such information would enable policy makers concerned about either the 
overall level or the distribution of student achievement to design better licensure, salary 
and other teacher policies.    
Despite prodigious amounts of research, debate still rages about the effect of 
specific teacher credentials on student achievement. Recently some researchers have tried 
to explain the variation in teacher “quality” (measured as just described by the variation 
in estimated intercepts) by variation in teacher credentials, but data limitations have often 
limited the analysis to only a few teacher credentials, such as teacher experience. The 
more traditional approach is simply to estimate in one step the relationship between 
student achievement and teacher credentials. Many such studies focus primarily on 
credentials such as years of experience or graduate degrees that have budgetary costs (see 
meta analyses of such studies by Hanushek (1997) and Hedges, Laine, and Greenwald,   4
1994). Others focus on particular credentials such as licenses or National Board 
Certification (Goldhaber and Brewer, 2004, Goldhaber and Anthony, 2005).   We pursue 
this more direct approach in this paper.  
Specifically, we use a rich administrative data set from North Carolina to explore 
a range of questions related to the relationship between teacher characteristics and 
credentials on the one hand and student achievement on the other. Though the basic 
questions underlying this research are not new  -- and, indeed, have been explored in 
many papers over the years within the rubric of the “education production function” --  
the availability of  data on all teachers and students in North Carolina over a ten-year 
period allows us to explore them in more detail and with far more confidence than has 
been possible in previous studies. Particularly relevant to this study is that North Carolina 
has been testing all students in reading and math from grades three to eight since the early 
1990s and that the tests are closely linked to the state’s Standard Course of Study.  Thus, 
students in North Carolina are being tested on the knowledge and skills that the state 
wants them to know. Further, the existence of a relatively sophisticated test-based 
accountability system gives teachers strong incentives to teach them that material. 
The teacher credentials in which we are most interested are those that can be 
affected in one way or another by policy, either through incentives to induce teachers to 
change their credentials (such as by offering higher pay to teachers with master’s 
degrees), by setting the rules on who can become a teacher  (such as by licensing 
requirements) or by formal or informal decisions that determine how teachers with 
stronger or weaker credentials are distributed among schools. Ultimately, we are 
interested in determining what teacher-related policies are most likely to promote student   5
achievement and to reduce achievement gaps between various groups of students (such as 
minority and white students or low-income and more affluent students). Given that 
spending on teachers constitutes such a large share of education budgets and that 
effective teachers are currently so unevenly distributed across classrooms, additional 
research on the link between teacher credentials is both valuable and important for 
education policy.   
This paper builds on our previous cross-sectional research on teacher credentials 
and characteristics (Clotfelter, Ladd and Vigdor, 2006). In that study, we used a portion 
of the same North Carolina data to estimate a model of fifth grade student achievement in 
2002, paying particular attention to the sorting of teachers and students among schools 
and classrooms. Emerging from that research was abundant evidence that teachers with 
stronger credentials tend to teach in schools with more advantaged and higher performing 
students and, to a far lesser extent, that similar matching occurs across classrooms within 
schools. As we document in that paper, without careful attention to this nonrandom 
matching of teachers to students, the estimated effects of teacher credentials on student 
achievement are likely to be biased upward.  A major purpose of our earlier paper was to 
show how a large administrative data set can be used to overcome such statistical 
problems in cross sectional analysis. After making the appropriate statistical adjustments 
we concluded that the two credentials most consistently linked to student achievement 
were teacher experience --  with the largest effects emerging within the first few years of 
teaching -- and teacher test scores.   
This new research differs in its use of longitudinal data covering all the North 
Carolina students in grades 3,4, and 5 in years 1995-2004 for whom we can identify their   6
teachers of math and reading. As a longitudinal study, this paper builds most closely on 
Jonah Rockoff’s (2004) study of the impact of individual teachers for three districts in 
New Jersey  and Hanushek, Kain , O’Brien and Rivkin’s (HKOR) (2005) study of the 
market for teacher quality that is based on data for one district in Texas. We are working 
with richer and larger data sets than Rockoff and HKOR since our data cover a whole 
state. Moreover, we have better achievement measures than in HKOR, and richer sets of 
teacher credentials and student characteristics than either Rockoff or HKOR.  We believe 
that the North Carolina data set is the only statewide data set that permits the matching of 
student test scores to specific teachers.  
Our basic approach is to estimate a variety of models beginning with a standard 
value-added model in which student achievement in the current year is estimated as a 
function of the student’s achievement in the prior year, and student, teacher, and 
classroom characteristics in the current year, and progressing to models that include 
student fixed effects. These fixed effects, which can be included only when longitudinal 
data are available,  provide powerful protection against the left-out variable bias that 
typically plagues research of this type. By controlling for the time-invariant 
characteristics of students that may affect achievement – both those that are observed and 
those that are unobserved – the fixed effect approach eliminates many of the statistical 
problems that arise in a linear model because of the non-random matching of teachers to 
students.  
The reliance on longitudinal data is also advantageous in that it permits us to 
explore in some detail the mechanisms through which teacher credentials exert their 
impacts. As one example, in our previous cross sectional work we were not able to   7
determine if our finding of a positive relationship between years of teaching experience 
and student achievement was the result of individual teachers becoming more effective as 
they gained experience or of higher rates of attrition for lower-quality than for higher 
quality teachers. With longitudinal data, we are able to shed additional light on that issue. 
Other examples include the potential for more detailed analysis of the effects of master’s 
degrees, licensure policies, and National Board Certification.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section II we present our 
conceptual framework. In section III  we describe  the North Carolina data with particular 
attention to the challenge of identifying the correct math and reading teachers for each 
student. Section IV presents our results for five basic models and section V puts the 
estimated magnitudes into perspective. In section VI we explore a number of elaborations 
of the basic model that permit us to generate greater insights into the mechanism through 
which the various credentials affect student achievement. The paper ends with a brief 
concluding discussion. 
 
I.  Empirical framework  
 
The starting point for our analysis is the observation that education is a cumulative 
process. In the context of a very simple model in which the only component of education 
that matters is teacher quality and in which all other determinants of achievement such as 
student background, ability, and motivation are set aside, we can write 
Ait = f(TQit, TQi t-1,….) + error  
where A refers to student achievement and TQ refers to teacher quality. This equation 
expresses student i’s  achievement in year t as a function of the quality of her teacher in 
that year and in all previous school years plus a random error.    8
 
Two additional assumptions permit us to transform this relationship into one that 
can be used to estimate the effects of teacher quality in year t on the student’s 
achievement in year t, controlling for the effects of teacher quality in all prior years. One 
assumption is that the effect of teacher quality on a student’s achievement in the 
contemporaneous year is constant across years and that the relationship is linear.  The 
second is that any decay in student achievement, or knowledge, from one year to the next 
occurs at a constant rate. As a result, the rate at which a student’s knowledge persists 
from one year to the next is also constant. Letting β be the effect of TQ and α  the rate at 
which knowledge persists, we can rewrite equation 1 as  
Ait = βTQit + αβTQ it-1 + α
2βTQi t-1 + α
3βTQ it-2 + … + errorit 
and, after rearranging terms, as  
 A it = βTQit + α(βTQ it-1 + αβTQit-2 + α βTQit-3 + …  ) + errorit  
Given that the expression within the parenthesis is simply Ait-1, we end up with 
 A it = βTQit +αAit-1 + errorit.  
Thus, the effects on current achievement of the student’s prior teachers are captured by 
the lagged achievement term. If the prior year achievement has no effect on current 
achievement, the persistence coefficient, α, would be zero.   
  Models of this form, which are typically referred to as value-added models, are 
commonly used in the literature to estimate β, namely the effect of current teachers on 
current achievement. Their popularity comes largely from their simplicity and intuitive 
appeal. Logically, it makes sense that one would want to control statistically for the 
achievement, or knowledge, that the student brings to the classroom at the beginning of   9
the year when estimating the effect of her current teacher. In addition, the value-added 
model is flexible in that it does not impose a specific assumption about the rate at which 
knowledge persists over time; instead it allows that rate to be estimated.  Nonetheless, as 
we discuss further below, such models are still subject to various statistical concerns that 
could lead to upward or downward estimates of β, the key coefficient of interest.  
  Our empirical strategy in this paper is to start with a more elaborate form of this 
simple value added model (see model 1 below).  We then modify the model in various 
ways in an effort to address some of the statistical concerns. One modification is to add 
fixed effects, either for schools or for students. Another is to change the dependent 
variable from the level of achievement to the gain in achievement, defined as Ait – Ait-1.  
We report results for the following five models.  
Model 1. Value- added model with no fixed effects. 
We start with a more elaborate form of the basic value-added model. Thus, in 
model 1 the achievement of a student in year t is specified as a function of the student’s 
prior achievement; teacher characteristics (both those that are time invariant and those 
that vary over time), class room characteristics; and student characteristics (both those 
that are time invariant and those that vary over time).
1  The relevant variables or vectors 
of variables are defined as follows.    
Ait is achievement of student i in year t as measured by a normalized test score in 
reading or math.  
 
 A it-1 is achievement of the ith student in the prior year.
2  
                                                 
1 For thoughtful discussions of value added models see Todd and Wolpin, 2003) and Boardman and 
Murnane, 1979.  
2 For simplicity, the lagged achie   vement term refers here, and also in the basic regressions, to the same 
subject as the dependent variable.  As we note below we also estimated some regressions in which we 
included lagged achievement terms for both math and reading as well as squared terms for each of them, on 
the ground that prior achievement in both math and reading could affect current year achievement in either 
subject.       10
TCF is a vector of teacher characteristics, such as the teacher’s race and gender,  
that are fixed over time for any specific teacher.   
 
TCVt is a vector of teacher characteristics that vary over time, including, for 
example, years of teaching experience, attainment of higher degrees, or 
attainment of a particular type of license.  
 
Ct is a vector of classroom characteristics that vary depending on the student’s 
classroom each year. These include class size and characteristics of peers.    
 
SCFi  is a vector of measurable student characteristics that are fixed over time, 
such as a student’s race, gender, and age in grade 3. For reasons explained below 
we also include in this category the education level of the student’s parents and 
whether the child is eligible for a subsidized lunch even though such 
characteristics could potentially change over time. In some of our models these 
variables are replaced with student fixed effects that capture the effects not only 
of the time-invariant student characteristics that can be observed and measured 
but also those that are unobserved.  
 
 SCVit = a vector of student characteristics that vary over time. These include 
indicator variables for thing such as grade repetition  or movement to a new 
school. 
  
 u it is an error term   
 
 
Specifically, we estimate the following value added model:     
 







(j)   
  (1)    
 
In addition to the variables defined above, Dit 
(j) is an indicator variable for whether the 
student had the jth teacher in year t.  The coefficients  β1  to β5  are vectors rather than 
individual parameters, and α is the persistence parameter.  Of most interest are the 
vectors of coefficients that relate to the teachers, that is, the parameter vectors denoted by 
β3 and β4.    
.  The estimates of the teacher coefficients are subject to at least two sources of bias. 
First, and most important, the coefficients will be biased if teachers with stronger   11
qualifications are matched in some systematic way with students exhibiting 
characteristics that are not fully controlled for in the model. To the extent that there is 
positive matching in the sense that teachers with stronger qualifications are matched to 
students who are educationally more advantaged along dimensions that are hard to 
measure, the coefficients would be biased upward. This bias arises because too much of 
the achievement of the high achieving students would be attributed to the teacher 
variables rather than to the unobserved characteristics of the students.   
Second, the inclusion of the lagged achievement variable on the right hand side of 
the equation is a problem, both because the variable is likely to be noisy and because any 
correlation of achievement over time would render the variable endogenous. A noisy 
variable is one in which the random error is large relative to the true signal.  The lagged 
test score is likely to be noisy both because the test itself is an imperfect means of 
gauging student knowledge and because a student’s performance on any one test is 
subject to the vagaries of the testing environment, such as how well the student feels on 
the day of the test or how crowded the room is. In general, measurement error of this type 
generates a downward bias in the coefficient of the variable itself and also biases the 
coefficients of other variables in hard–to-predict ways.
3 The correlation between the 
lagged achievement variable and the error term in the current achievement equation 
introduces additional bias of undetermined sign. The standard solution for both problems 
is to use the statistical technique of instrumental variables, provided a good instrument is 
available. Though a twice lagged achievement variable could potentially serve that 
                                                 
3 Though the dependent variable is subject to measurement error as well, that error simply shows up in the 
error term and ins not a source of bias.    12
purpose, we have chosen not to use that approach in this paper given the short length of 
our data panels..    
Model 2. Value-added model with school fixed effects. 
In prior research we have documented that teachers are indeed positively matched 
to students in North Carolina. (Clotfelter, Ladd and Vigdor, 2006). Moreover, we find 
that most of this positive matching occurs at the school, rather than the classroom, level. 
This pattern of positive matching across schools largely reflects the use of a single salary 
schedule across schools within each district, that teachers value working conditions --  
which are determined in part by the characteristics of their students --  as well as their 
salaries, and a typical internal transfer policy that favors more highly qualified teachers. 
Given that more advantaged students are often deemed easier and more rewarding to 
teach than those from disadvantaged backgrounds, highly qualified teachers have an 
incentive to move away from schools with large proportions of disadvantaged students in 
favor of schools with more advantaged and easier-to-educate students.  
Model 2 directly addresses the upward bias of the teacher coefficients that arises 
from this positive matching by the inclusion of school fixed effects. In essence the model 
includes  0-1 indicator variables for each school, and thereby controls for the unchanging 
characteristics of each school,  both those characteristics that are observed and 
measurable and those that are not. The inclusion of the school fixed effects means that the  
effects on student achievement of the teacher qualification variables are identified only 
by the variation across classrooms within each school, and not at all by how teachers are 
distributed across schools.  As a result, any upward bias in the estimates caused by the   13
positive matching of teachers and students across schools is eliminated provided the 
characteristics of schools enter the model in a linear manner.    
  Though model 2 goes a long way toward eliminating the bias associated with the 
nonrandom matching of teachers and students across schools, it does not address the bias 
that may arise from any nonrandom matching of students to teachers across classrooms 
within schools.  Our prior research suggests that any nonrandom matching of this type is 
likely to be small.  Nonetheless some bias may well remain.  In addition, this model is 
still subject to any bias caused by the correlation between the lagged achievement term 
and the error term.
 4   
Model 3. Gains model, with school fixed effects 
  One potential solution to the statistical problems associated with having the 
lagged dependent variable on the right side of the equation is to move that variable to the 
left side and to use gains in achievement, that is Ait – A it-1, as the dependent variable.   
This gains specification would be equivalent to the previous model only if there were no 
decay in knowledge from year to year, that is, only if the persistence coefficient in the 
value-added model were equal to 1.   
  In the more likely case in which the true coefficient on the lagged term is less than 
one, so that the decay rate (1-α) is positive, the gains model is misspecified  and, under 
reasonable assumptions, will lead to downward  biased estimates of the effects of teacher 
                                                 
4  As emphasized by Todd and Wolpin  (2003), implicit in this general form of the value-added 
specification is the  assumption that the effects of the input coefficients decay at the same rate for all years. 
In addition, unless the ability endowment also decays at the same rate at the input effects, the lagged term 
(which represents baseline achievement) will be correlated with the error time and the coefficients cannot  
be consistently estimated with OLS. As Todd and Wolpin state : “Any value-added model that admits to 
the presence of unobserved  endowments must also recognize that baseline achievement will then logically 
be endogenous.” Page F 21. Moreover, that endogeneity will affect not only the coefficient of the lagged 
term but also the estimates of all the input effects.   
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qualifications on current achievement. The logic here is as follows. Missing from the 
right side of the gains equation is the lagged achievement variable, which in this case 
would have entered with a coefficient of –(1-α) to capture the loss in achievement due to 
decay. Because this variable is missing, the other variables in the equation, such as the 
teacher qualification variables, will pick up some of the negative effect to the extent that 
qualifications of teachers facing particular students are positively correlated from one 
grade to the next. 
  Thus, the gains model solves one problem but introduces another. On balance, we 
prefer model 2 based on our intuition that the imposition of an incorrect assumption about 
the rate of decay is likely to create more bias than does the presence of the lagged 
achievement term on the right hand side of the equation. At the same time, given the 
statistical problems caused by the inclusion of the lagged achievement term in that model,  
we cannot conclude with certainty that model 2 is preferred.  
Model 4. Levels model with student fixed effects (and no lagged achievement variable) 
  None of the first three models makes full use of the longitudinal data that are 
available for this study. The next two models do so by including student fixed effects, 
first in a model with student achievement as the dependent variable (model 4) and second 
in a model with gains in achievement as the dependent variable (model 5). Though 
neither model generates unbiased coefficients of the teacher variables, under reasonable 
assumptions the coefficients that emerge from the two models should bracket the true 
coefficients.  
  Like model 2, the dependent variable in model 4 is the level of student 
achievement. This model differs in that it includes student, rather school, fixed effects   15
and excludes the lagged achievement term. Compared to model 2, this model more 
effectively eliminates any bias associated with the nonrandom matching of teachers and 
students.  This conclusion follows because the presence of student fixed effects means 
that the only variation used to estimate the coefficients of interest is variation within, not 
across, individual students. Thus, the question is not whether one student who is taught 
by a teacher with a given qualification achieves on average at a higher level than a 
different student facing a teacher with a lower qualification but rather whether any single 
student does better or worse when she is taught by a teacher with the higher qualification 
than when that same student is taught by a teacher with a lower qualification. As a result 
of these within-students comparisons, any nonrandom matching of teachers and students 
either across schools or across classrooms within schools becomes irrelevant, provided 
the effects are linear.  
  Ideally, it would be useful to include lagged achievement as an explanatory 
variable is such a model but that strategy would not generate sensible results in the 
context of our data. As described below, we have data on many cohorts of students but 
for each student we have only three years of test scores, typically those for grades 3, 4 
and 5. The shortness of each panel renders it undesirable to include the lagged dependent 
variable along with student fixed effects, given that the latter picks up each student’s 
average achievement over the three-year time span. The problem is that the only variation 
remaining in the lagged achievement term variable for each student is now the variation 
around the average, a large portion of which in a short panel is likely to be random error. 
Thus the problem of excessive noise relative to true signal becomes acute in this case. 
Moreover, whatever variation remains continues to be correlated with the error term of   16
the model.  In the context of longer panels, it may be possible to address these problems 
with the use of twice lagged achievement as an instrumental variable. We do not have the 
luxury of estimating such a model in this case.  
  The fact that the lagged term is missing from the equation leads to downward 
biased estimates of the relevant coefficients, regardless of how the teacher characteristics 
for specific students are correlated across grades.
5 Only if knowledge did not persist at all 
from one year to the next, would this model generate unbiased estimates. Note that the 
more that knowledge persists from one year to the next (that is, the larger is α), the larger 
will be the downward bias in the coefficients of interest.   
Model 5. Gains model with student fixed effects. 
  As discussed above, we can incorporate the lagged achievement term directly by 
respecifying the dependent variable as the gains in achievement rather than the levels of 
achievement. For model 5, we follow that strategy, but in contrast to model 3, include  
student, rather than school, fixed effects.  
  In stark contrast to the gains model without student fixed effects (model 3) , 
model 5 generates upward biased estimates of the effects of teacher characteristics. In a 
simple model, the size of the bias would be proportional to the decay rate (1-α)/2  and 
would not depend on how teacher qualifications are correlated over time.
6 When there is 
no decay (so that α = 1), this expression equals 0 and there is no bias. The greater is the 
rate of decay, the more the coefficients of interest will be biased upward. In the extreme 
case in which there is no persistence of knowledge from one year to the next,  (so that α 
                                                 
5 The discussion of bias in this model and in the next draws heavily on the insights from a note by Steven 
Rivkin (2006) and an application to the effects on achievement of school racial composition (Hanushek, 
Kain and Rivkin (2006).  
6 See Rivkin (2006), equation 10, p.7.     17
= 0), the estimated coefficients from the gains model with student fixed effects could be 
too large by half.  
The following table summarizes the five models. Our preferred models are 4 and 
5 because they include student fixed effects and hence protect again any bias associated 
with nonrandom matching of teachers and students across classrooms in the context of a 
linear model. Though neither of the preferred models generates unbiased estimates of the 
effects of teacher qualifications, we are quite confident that together they will bracket the 
true coefficients.  
Summary table 









Likely direction of  
bias of effects of 
teacher credentials  
Model 1   Levels  yes  none  upward   
Model 2   Levels  yes  school   unclear, but small   
Model 3  Gains   no   school  downward  
Model 4  Levels   no   student  downward 
Model 5  Gains   no   student   upward  
 
 
   
II. The North Carolina Data.  
 
The data we use for this study are derived from administrative records maintained 
by the North Carolina Education Research Data Center, housed at Duke University.  We 
link several different sets of records to form the database used for this analysis. Student 
information, including race, gender, participation in the federal free and reduced price 
lunch subsidy program, education level of the parents, and standardized test scores are 
derived from student test records. The teacher data come from a state-maintained archive 
of personnel records.  For each teacher, information is available on type of license, 
licensure test scores, including the test taken and the year it was administered;    18
undergraduate institution attended, whether the teacher has any advanced degrees or is 
National Board Certified, and the number of years of teaching experience.   
Crucial for this analysis is the identification of each student’s actual math and 
reading teacher. For self-contained classrooms, which are common in elementary 
schools, the student might well have the same teacher for math and reading. In other 
school structures, the teachers could well differ. Although each record of a student’s test 
score in either math or reading identifies the teacher who administered the test, we were 
not willing simply to assume that this proctor was in fact the student’s teacher of that 
subject. We first checked to make sure that the student’s proctor was a valid math (or 
reading) teacher. We deemed a proctor to be the actual teacher if she taught a course with 
a state-specified code for the relevant subject during the semester in which the test was 
administered. 
7  We supplemented this approach with two other identification strategies.  
When the proctor was not a valid math or reading teacher, but the student was in a school 
and grade in which a single math (reading) teacher had at least a 95 percent share of the 
math (reading) students, we assigned that teacher to the student. Finally, in a few cases 
we were able to make either an exact or an approximate match, based on the 
characteristics of the group of students taking the test together and our information from 
school activity reports about the characteristics of the classes taught by the proctor of 
those students during that semester.
8   
                                                 
7 In particular, a teacher was deemed to be a valid math teacher if that teacher taught a course with one of 
the following subject codes: 0000, 0120,0123,01234,0129,0230,0239,0290,0420,0423 or any code between 
and including 2001 and 2078. A teacher was deemed a valid reading teacher is that teacher taught a course 
with one of the following subject codes: 0000,0109,0120,0123,0124,0129,0130,0140, or any coed between 
and including 1001 and 1038.  
 
8  The composition of students taking an end-of-grade exam together with a particular teacher proctor was 
compared to the compositions of students in the classes taught by that teacher during the semester the test 
was given. In the event of an exact match in the total number of students and in the numbers of  male,   19
 These procedures allowed us to identify math and reading teachers for at least 75 
percent of all students in grades 3, 4 and 5 during the period 1994/05 to 2003/04. For 
grades 6 to 8 we were far less successful. For 2002/03, for example, we were able to 
match only 34 percent of the sixth grade students, only 29 percent of the seventh graders 
and only 26 percent of the eighth graders to their math teachers. These low match rates in 
the higher grades forced us to limit our analysis to students in grades 3, 4 and 5. The  
match rates for each cell for both math and reading are shown in table 1.  Appendix table 
A1 reports the total number of students in each grade and year for which test scores are 
available in each subject.  
In all our regressions, the dependent variable is a standardized end-of grade test 
score in either reading or math for each student or the year-to-year change in that 
variable.  As noted earlier, these tests are directly related to the state’s standard course of 
study for each grade. Each test score is reported on a development scale score, but we 
converted all the scale scores to standardized scores with means of zero and standard 
deviations equal to one based on the test scores in each subject in each grade in each year. 
This standardization makes it possible to compare test scores across grades and years.  
Teacher credentials and characteristics  
  The basic measures of teacher credentials include licensure test scores, years of 
teaching experience, type of license, quality of undergraduate college, whether the 
teacher has an advanced degree, and licensure test scores. We describe here the measures 
                                                                                                                                                 
female, white , and nonwhite students, we treated the teacher of that class as the relevant teacher for that 
group of students. For an approximate match, we determined the percentage difference between the class 
taught by that teacher and the group of students the teacher proctored for each characteristic.  A match was 
considered approximately accurate if the square root of the sum of the squared percentage differences did 
not exceed 0.125.  
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that we use in the basic equations. In section VI, we describe additional forms of some of 
the credentials.  
Teacher test scores. From the early 1960s through the mid-1990s, all elementary school 
teachers in North Carolina were required to take either the Elementary Education or the 
Early Childhood Education test. Included in the former was material on curriculum, 
instruction and assessment. Starting in the mid-1990s, teachers were required to take both 
that basic elementary test and a test that focused on content.  We normalized test scores 
on each of these tests separately for each year the test was administered based on means 
and standard deviations from test scores for all teachers in our data set, not just those in 
our subset of teachers matched to students.  For teachers with multiple test scores in their 
personnel file, our teacher test score variable is set equal to the average of all scores for 
which we can perform the normalization.   
Years of teaching experience. We measure years of teaching experience as the number of 
years used by the state to determine a teacher’s salary. Thus, this measure counts all the 
years of teaching whether in the State of North Carolina, or elsewhere, for which the state 
has given the teacher credit.
9  Because of our own prior research and that of others (e.g. 
Hanushek, Kain, O’Brien and Rivkin, 2005), we expect the returns to additional years of 
experience to be highest in the early years. We allow for this nonlinearity by specifying 
years of experience as a series of indicator variables, with the base or left-out category 
being no experience. 
                                                 
9 The teacher experience variable was missing for some teachers.  In cases where it was possible to observe 
experience levels in payroll records from other years, we imputed values.  In cases where observations 
from other years’ payroll data were inconsistent with the recent record, we put more weight on the more 
recent record.    21
Licensure information.  The state of North Carolina has many types of licenses which we 
have divided into three categories: regular, lateral entry and  “other.” Lateral entry 
licenses are issued to individuals who hold at least a bachelors degree with a minimum 
2.5 GPA and the equivalent of a college major in the area in which they are assigned to 
teach. Such teachers must affiliate with colleges and university to complete prescribed 
coursework. Currently the licenses are issued for two years and can be renewed for a 
third year. Because lateral entrants who remain in teaching eventually convert to a regular 
license, we include an additional variable to identify those teachers in a later year who 
initially entered as a lateral entrant. The “other” category includes a variety of 
provisional, temporary, and emergency licenses.  
Graduate degree. For the basic regression we include a single variable to indicate 
whether the teacher has a graduate degree of any type such as a masters that leads to a 
higher salary, Ph.D., or other advanced degree including those that do not affect the 
teacher’s salary. In subsequent analysis we break these degrees down by type and by 
when the teacher earned the advanced degree.  
National Board Certification.  North Carolina has been a leader in the national movement 
to have teachers board certified by the National Board for Professional Teaching 
Standards (NBPTS), and provides incentives in the form of a 12 percent boost in pay for 
teachers to do so. Such certification, which requires teachers put together a portfolio and 
to complete a series of exercises and activities designed to test their knowledge of 
material for their particular field, takes well over a year and is far more difficult to obtain 
than state licensure. For this study we obtained the names of all North Carolina certified 
teachers by year and grade from the NBPTS and then the NC Education Research Data   22
Center matched those names to our information on all North Carolina teachers. Despite 
significant effort, we were able to match only about 90 percent of the teachers.
10 As of 
2004, our matched sample of math and reading teachers included about 300 board 
certified teachers in each of the grades 3-5.  
Quality of undergraduate institution.   Available for each teacher is the name of the 
undergraduate institution from which she graduated. Following standard practice we 
assign to each institution a competitive ranking based on information for the 1997-98 
freshman class from the Barron’s College Admissions Selector.  Barron’s reports seven 
categories which we aggregated to four categories: uncompetitive, competitive, very 
competitive, and unranked. Many of the state’s teacher preparation programs are offered 
by state institutions in the competitive category.  
Teacher characteristics. In addition to these measures of teacher credentials, the basic 
equations also include a number of standard teacher characteristics. These include the 
indicator variables for whether the teacher is male, black, Hispanic or “other race.”  In 
addition, in light of the work by Dee (2005) we include a variable indicating whether or 
not the teacher is the same race as the student. Similarly, we include a variable indicating 
whether the teacher is the same gender as the student.   
Student characteristics 
  As discussed earlier, student-specific variables come in two forms: those that 
measure relatively permanent characteristics and those that vary over time. Only the ones 
                                                 
10 For each Board Certified teacher we had the teacher’s name, and after 2000, the teacher’s school in most 
cases. In addition to the standard problems of matching names with potential variation in spelling, two 
other explanations help to account for the incomplete match. First is that some Board Certified teachers are 
teaching in private schools and, hence, are not in our data set. Second, we are likely to lose some teachers 
whose names changed between the fall when they were identified as Board Certified  and the spring term, 
or who stopped being a NC teacher during that period.      23
that vary over time are used in models 4 and 5 because of the presence of the student 
fixed effects in those models.  Included in the permanent category are the student’s race, 
gender, and age in grade three.
11 In addition, we include indicators for whether the 
student is classified as limited English, gifted, or special needs. Though each of these 
latter characteristics may vary over time, we exclude them from the models with student 
fixed effects on the ground that such variation is likely to be small.  
  In addition, data considerations force us to treat as nonvarying two measures of 
the student’s family background: family income as proxied by whether or not the student 
is eligible for a subsidized lunch and the education level of the student’s parents.  
Because student-specific information on subsidized lunch is missing from the early years 
of our data set, we have chosen to assign a single status to each student based on her 
subsidized lunch status in 7
th or 8
th grade, years for which we have information for all 
cohorts.
12  Given that middle school students are often more reluctant than students in 
earlier grades to apply for subsidized lunches, this variable is a relatively conservative 
measure of family poverty. The problem with our information on parental education is 
that because it is based on teacher reports it exhibits a lot of noise over time. Though the 
actual education level of the parents could change as parents earn more degrees, marry or 
divorce, we suspect that most of the variation reported on the student’s test score record 
over time is noise. Hence, we identify a parent as having a college degree or more, a high 
                                                 
11 We include the age variable to account for the fact that student start school at different ages and hence at 
different stages of their development. The age variable also picks up the effect of repeating or skipping 
earlier grades, but not of repeating the current grade which is represented by a separate variable. 
12 Specifically, for a student for whom we have data from either 7
th or 8
th grade, we assign the value 1 to the 
students if she was on free or reduced price lunch in either of those years. For a student for whom we do 
not have that data for either of those grades but for whom we have such information for an earlier year we 
use the earlier information. The goal is to use the most consistent data available while retaining as large a 
sample as possible.    24
school degree or more but no college degree, or no high school degree based on the most 
common identification for a students during the grades 3-8.
13    
The student-level variables that change over time include indicator variables for 
the following: the student is repeating the grade, the student has transferred into the 
school that year, and the student has transferred into the school as part of a structural 
change, such as from a school than ends in fourth grade to a school that begins in fifth 
grade.
14 These time-varying variables are included in all five models. In addition, we 
include in models 1 and 2, each student’s lagged test score in the specified subject in the 
prior year.       
Classroom characteristics 
  The classroom variables include the class size, and several measures of the 
characteristics of the student’s peers. These measures include the percentages of students 
who are nonwhite and who are on subsidized lunch, and the percentages of students 
whose parents have college degrees, have high school degrees, or are high school drop 
outs. Finally, in the model with lagged terms, we also included the lagged class average 
math or reading score as a proxy for the average ability level in the class. Each of these 
peer variables is based on the other students in the class, that is, excluding the student for 
whom the peer groups are being defined.   
III. Basic results    
Tables 2 and 3 summarize the results for the teacher variables for the five models  
for math and reading, respectively. In all cases, the reported regressions are based on as 
                                                 
13 For example, we identify a parent as having a college degree if for a majority of years for which we have 
information for that student, the parent is identified as having a college degree.  
14 Though Rockoff (2004) also includes a variable indicating that a student will repeat the grade, that 
variable is potentially endogenous and, hence, does not belong in the equation.    25
much data as possible. Hence, because model 4 includes no lagged term either as an 
independent variable or as part of the depending variable, the reported results are based 
on the achievement of 3rd, 4th and 5
th graders, rather than just of  4
th and 5
th graders as in 
the other models.
15  To highlight the findings for teacher characteristics and credentials, 
the tables exclude the coefficients of the time-invariant student variables included in 
models 1 and 2 and the time-varying student variables included in all five models. The 
coefficients for those variables are reported in appendix tables A2 and A3.  Of interest is 
that many of the student-specific variables, such as parental education, exert larger effects 
on reading than on math.  
The findings for the teacher variables are remarkably consistent across the five 
models, and, perhaps most importantly, are consistent with the predictions about the 
direction of the biases for the estimated effects of the teacher credentials. Comparing the 
results for the teacher experience variables for math, we find, as expected, that the 
coefficients from model 1 are higher than those for models 2 and 3. In addition, the 
results tend to confirm the prediction that models 4 and 5 provide upper and lower 
bounds on the true effects. We refer to these lower and upper bounds as we quantify 
effects in the following discussion.   
The lagged achievement terms, which appear only in models 1 and 2, enter with 
coefficients of about 0.70 for math and about 0.68 for reading. Given that any bias in 
these coefficients is likely to be toward zero because of measurement error, these 
estimates are consistent with the conclusion that the rate at which knowledge persists 
                                                 
15 We have also estimated model 4  equations for the sample restricted to 4
th and 5
th graders. The estimated 
patterns are similar to those presented, with the coefficients of the teacher credentials variables typically 
somewhat smaller than the ones reported in table 4.  We prefer the reported results on the ground that 
longer panels are preferred to shorter ones.        26
from one year to the next is well over 50 percent. That would render the results for 
teacher credentials from model 5 (which would generate unbiased estimates of teacher 
credentials if the persistence rate were 100 percent) somewhat closer to the truth than 
those in model 4 (which would generate unbiased results if the persistence rate were 
zero.) 
16  
Teacher characteristics  
  We turn first to the effects of teacher characteristics.  For math achievement, we 
find quite consistent results across models, with male teachers generating less positive 
results than female teachers, and black teachers less positive results than white teachers. 
For reading, in contrast, no differences emerge in the effectiveness of black and white 
teachers in any of the models.  Of most interest is the finding that when a student and a 
teacher are the same race, the effects on student achievement are positive, with an effect 
size of about 0.020 to 0.029 standard deviations for math and 0.013 to 0.020 for reading.  
Thus our results confirm those of Dee (2005) based on his study of data from the 
Tennessee Star Experiment in which students were randomly assigned to classrooms and, 
hence, to teachers. 
Teacher credentials 
  Though the estimated patterns of results for teacher credentials are similar for 
math and reading, in almost all cases the estimated achievement effects of the various 
teacher credentials are larger for math. That pattern is not surprising given the common 
view that schools have a larger role to play relative to families in the teaching of math 
                                                 
16 To account for the possibility that achievement in math or reading may be affected by prior achievement 
in both subjects and in a nonlinear way, we estimated other versions of model 2 that included lagged test 
scores in both subjects in both linear and squared form (results not shown). The addition of those variables 
has no noticeable effect on the estimates of the teacher credentials in model 2.   27
than in reading and also in light of the finding that the student characteristics exhibit 
larger impacts on reading than on math achievement in these models. Thus, we focus the 
text discussion on the math results as shown in Table 2.  
  Consistent with other studies (see, in particular, Hanushek, Kain, O’Brien and 
Rivkin 2005 and Clotfelter, Ladd and Vigdor, 2006), we find clear evidence that teachers 
with more experience are more effective than those with less experience. Compared to a 
teacher with no experience, the benefits of experience rise monotonically to a peak in the 
range of  0.092  (from model 4) to 0.119 (from model 5) standard deviations after 21-27 
years of experience, with more than half of the gain occurring during the first couple of 
years of teaching. In section VI, we explore these findings in more detail. 
  Teacher licensure also seems to matter. Here the base case is a teacher with a 
regular license. Most clear are the negative effects on achievement for those with “other” 
types of provisional or emergency licenses, with the estimates ranging from -0.033 to –
0.059 across models 4 and 5.   Teachers operating under a lateral entry license exhibit a 
statistically significant negative average effect on student achievement, but only in model 
4 and it is not clear whether that negative effects persists after the lateral entrant receives 
a regular license.  These results for lateral entrants appear to be quite consistent with the 
more detailed investigation of pathways into teaching in New York State by Boyd et al. 
(2006). That study found that teachers with reduced coursework prior to entry often 
exhibited smaller initial gains that other teachers, but that the differentials were small and  
disappeared as the cohort matured.     
Despite that fact that teachers are rewarded in the form of higher salaries for 
having a master’s degree, the variable denoting having a graduate degree exerts no   28
statistically significant effect on student achievement and in some cases the coefficient is 
negative.  We explore the reasons for that finding in section VI.  In contrast, teachers who 
are National Board certified appear to be more effective (with coefficients of 0.020 to 
0.027) than those who are not.  However, from these basic regressions we cannot tell 
whether this greater effectiveness is because the teachers who become Board certified are 
the more effective teachers to begin with or whether the rigorous process of Board 
certification makes them better teachers. We return to that issue below.  
  We have included a measure of the competitiveness of the teacher’s 
undergraduate institution since that is a common measure of teacher credentials used in 
other studies. Perhaps because of the rich set of other measures included in this study, 
and in particular the inclusion of the teacher’s test score, these variables exhibit only very 
small effects, at most, on student achievement. The clearest finding is that a teacher who 
comes from an undergraduate institution ranked as competitive appears to be somewhat 
more effective on average than one from an uncompetitive institution. Coming from an 
elite and very competitive institution, however, apparently does not make a teacher any 
more effective on average relative to teachers from other institutions.  
  The final measure of teacher credentials, the teacher’s test score, enters as 
expected with a positive and statistically significant coefficient. The coefficient implies 
that a teacher whose test scores were one standard deviation above the average would 
increase student achievement by 0.011 to 0.015 standard deviations. We provide more 
disaggregated results in section VI. . 
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Classroom Characteristics  
  Among the classroom characteristics the most consistent results emerge for the 
class size variable and the percent of students on free and reduced price lunch. Class size 
consistently enters with a negative coefficient of about 0.002 to 0.005. This finding 
implies that reducing class sizes in elementary schools by five students would increase 
student achievement by about 0.010 to 0.015 standard deviations on average.  
Also consistently negative for math achievement are the effects of concentrations 
of poor children in a student’s classroom.  A 10 percentage point increase in the fraction 
of students in the class receiving subsidized lunches decreases math achievement by 
about 0.005 standard deviation.  In addition, students in classrooms with greater 
proportions of parents who are high school graduates appear to do less well than those in 
which there are more college graduates.  
  
 V.  Interpreting the magnitudes  
 
Each teacher brings to the classroom a bundle of personal characteristics and 
credentials. Hence, we illustrate the magnitudes of the estimated teacher effects by 
comparing teachers with different bundles of attributes. Consider for example a baseline 
teacher with the following relatively typical attributes listed in the first column of Table 
4. The teacher has 10 years of experience, attended a competitive undergraduate college, 
and has a regular license, an average test score, and a graduate degree. In addition, we 
assume somewhat less typically that she is National Board certified.  We then compare 
her to a teacher with far weaker credentials as described in the second column. That 
teacher has no teaching experience, attended a non-competitive undergraduate college,   30
does not have a regular license, has a test score one standard deviation below average, 
does not have an advanced degree and is not Board certified.   
Based on the lower bound estimates from model 4 and the upper bound estimates  
from model 5, the following two columns depict the reasonable range of differential 
effects on student achievement in both math and reading, all other factors held constant. 
We remind the reader that the true effects are likely to be somewhat closer to the model 5 
than the model 4 estimates. The first observation to emerge from the calculations is the 
far larger adverse effects from having a teacher with weak credentials on math than on 
reading achievement. For math the total effects of having the weak teacher range from –
0.150 to –0.206 standard deviations and for reading from  -0.081 to –0.120.  Second, the 
biggest differentials are associated with experience and licensure status. Of course, by 
assuming the subject teacher has no teaching experience we have magnified the effects of 
experience. If, instead, the subject teacher had one or two years of experience, the total 
effect in math would have ranged from –0.093 to –0.134 and for reading would have 
been -0.049 to –0.077. Though the comparison in Table 4 is merely illustrative, it does 
provide some information with which to evaluate the magnitude of the estimated effects. 
The question is whether these teacher effects are large or small.
17  
Relative to the estimated effects of class size, the effects of teacher 
credentials.appear to be quite large. Based on the estimated coefficients for the class size 
variable, an increase of 5 students in an elementary school class would reduce student 
                                                 
17  Another way to address the question of magnitude is to take account of the fact that some of the 
variation in the dependent variable is measurement error. To account for that variation, one might want to 
gross up the estimates of the teacher credentials so that they reflect not the effects on measured test scores 
but rather the effects on a more accurate measure of learning.  Doing so would make the effects of teachers 
seem larger than in this study, but would have no effect on the comparisons of relative magnitudes that we 
discuss here.  
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achievement in math by about 0.015 to 0.025 standard deviations and in reading by about 
0.010 to 0.020 standard deviations, far smaller effects that those associated with having a 
teacher with weak credentials.  
An alternative comparison is to the effects of demographic characteristic such as 
parental education. From the results for student characteristics reported in the appendix 
for model 2 (the model with school, but not student, fixed effects), we see that, relative to 
having a parent who is a college graduate, having a parent without a college degree 
reduces predicted math achievement by about 0.11 standard deviations if the parent has a 
high school degree and by another 0.11 standard deviations if the parent is a high school 
drop out. The effects are slightly larger for reading: 0.11 for those with high school 
degrees and another 0.14 for high school drop outs.  Thus, for math, having a teacher 
with weak credentials has negative effects generally comparable in size to those 
associated with having poorly educated parents. For reading, the negative effects 
associated with having a teacher with poor credentials, though still harmful for 
achievement, are not as harmful as having poorly educated parents.  
  Thus, we conclude that a variety of teacher credentials matter for student 
achievement and that the effects are particularly large for achievement in math. As a 
result how teachers with differing qualifications are distributed among classrooms and 
schools matters.  To the extent that the teachers with weaker credentials end up in 
classrooms with the more educationally disadvantaged children, schools would tend to 
widen, rather than reduce, the already large achievement gaps associated with the 
socioeconomic differences that students bring to the classroom. In related research, we 
have documented that such disparities exist both by race of the student and poverty level   32
of the school (Clotfelter, Ladd and Vigdor, 2002, and Clotfelter, Ladd and Vigdor, 2006, 
and Clotfelter, Ladd, Vigdor and Wheeler, 2006)  
  
VI.  More detailed analysis of specific teacher credentials. 
  We now turn to more detailed analysis of four of the teacher credentials: graduate 
degrees, National Board Certification, teacher test scores, and teacher experience.  For 
this analysis we report results only for models 4 and 5, on the ground that they are likely 
to bracket the true results, and only for the specific credentials of interest.  In all cases, 
the new variables are embedded in the full models.   
Graduate degrees  
  One of the most counterintuitive findings to emerge from the basic models is the 
small or negative effects of having a graduate degree.  Most of those degrees are master’s 
degrees that generate higher salaries for teachers. A negative coefficient would suggest 
that having such a degree is not associated with higher achievement.  Thus, if the goal of 
the salary structure were to provide incentives for teachers to improve their teaching, the 
higher pay for master’s degrees would appear to be money that is not well spent, except 
to the extent that the option of getting a master’s degree keeps effective experienced 
teachers in the profession.  
The first step in our supplemental analysis is to disaggregate the degrees by type: 
master’s, advanced, and Ph.D. As we noted earlier the category of advanced degree 
generally applies to graduate degrees that do not increase teacher salaries and teachers are 
not required to report them. The first row of Table 5 replicates the coefficients that 
emerged for both math and reading from the basic model. The second panel shows the   33
disaggregated results. Emerging most clearly is the relatively large negative effects for 
advanced degrees and the very small -- and in half the cases not statistically significant -- 
negative coefficients for master’s degrees. Thus, it appears that the negative effect in the 
basic model is more attributable to the advanced degrees than to the master’s degrees. 
The large negative coefficient on the Ph.D variable for math is probably an anomaly 
given the small number of elementary school teachers with Ph.Ds. 
  In the third panel we disaggregate the master’s degrees by the period during 
which the teacher earned the degree. The estimates indicate that the teachers who 
received their degree prior to entering teaching or any time during the first five years of 
teachers were no less or no more effective than other teachers in raising student 
achievement.  In contrast, those who earned their master’s degree more than five years 
after they started teaching appear to be somewhat less effective on average than those 
who do not have master’s degrees. Whether this negative effect means that those who 
seek master’s degrees at that stage in their career are less effective teachers in general or 
whether having a master’s degree makes them less effective cannot be discerned with 
complete confidence from this analysis. The observation that the earlier master’s degree 
has no effect, however, suggests that the negative sign is more attributable to who selects 
into that category than to any negative effect of the degree itself.       
National Board Certification 
  The positive association that emerges between National Board Certification and 
student achievement in the basic models confirms that teachers with that credential are 
more effective, on average, than those who are not certified. However, those results alone 
cannot distinguish whether the National Board is simply identifying the most effective   34
teachers from whether the process itself (or possibly the recognition associated with 
certification) makes the teachers more effective than they otherwise would have been. 
Table 6 sheds light on this issue by reporting results for four NBCT indicator variables 
embedded in models 4 and 5.  NBCT-2 and NBCT-1 take on the value 1 two years and 
one year, respectively, prior to the year in which the teacher becomes certified. 
NBCTcurrent  takes on the value 1 in the academic year in which the teacher is certified 
and NBCTpost represents each subsequent year that she is certified.  
  The positive and statistically significant coefficients for NBCT-2 indicate that the 
Board does indeed confer certification on the more effective teachers, as would be 
appropriate to the extent that the policy goal is to reward effective teachers.  These 
coefficients range from 0.024 to 0.055 standard deviations for math and from 0.026 to 
0.038 standard deviations for reading.  The fact that the NBCTcurrent and post 
coefficients are all lower (although not in a statistically significant sense) than the NBCT-
2 coefficients provides no support for the hypothesis that the certification process makes 
teachers more effective than they otherwise would be. If anything, the lower coefficients 
on the NBCTpost variables suggest that teachers may be less effective – where 
effectiveness is measured by success in raising test scores—after receiving certification 
than before. Again, though, the differences between the NBCT-2 and NBCTpost 
coefficients are not statistically significant at standard levels.  
These findings are fully consistent with those of Goldhaber and Anthony’s more 
detailed study (2005) of National Board Certification in North Carolina for a somewhat 
earlier, but overlapping, time period. With these findings in hand, a logical next question 
for policy makers is the extent to which National Board Certification succeeds in keeping   35
the more effective teachers in the profession longer than would otherwise be the case. If 
certification has no effect on retention, then any additional salary paid to certified 
teachers is simply a reward for good work but not a way to improve student achievement. 
A second policy question relates to how Board certified teachers are distributed among 
schools and classrooms. As shown for fifth grade classrooms in Clotfelter, Ladd and 
Vigdor (2006), Board certified teachers tend to be in schools with whiter student bodies 
and with somewhat smaller proportions of low-income students compared to non-
certified teachers. Even more dramatic are the patterns across classrooms within schools. 
Compared to the classrooms of non-certified teachers within each school, the classrooms 
served by certified teachers were more advantaged along every dimension: race, income, 
education level of the parents, and mean average prior year test scores. These and other 
policy-relevant questions are the topic of ongoing research both by ourselves and of 
others.  
Teacher test scores 
   In the basic model, teacher test scores are simply normalized test scores averaged 
over all the tests taken by each elementary school teacher. As shown in the top row of 
Table 7, higher average test scores are associated with higher math and reading 
achievement, with far larger effects for math than for reading.  To test for nonlinear 
patterns, in the second panel of the table we disaggregated the test scores into a series of 
indicator variables.   
The results for math achievement are quite striking and exhibit some clear 
nonlinearity. Specifically, having a teacher at one of the extremes of the distribution has a 
big effect on achievement relative to having an average teacher. Referring to the results   36
for model 5 (based on achievement gains), we see that teachers who scored 2 or more 
standard deviations above the average boosted student gains  by 0.068 standard 
deviations relative to the average teacher, and teachers who scored 2 or more standard 
deviations below the average reduced achievement gains by 0.062 standard deviations. 
The overall difference between teachers at the two extremes is a whopping 0.130 
standard deviations, which is far larger than the 0.060 standard deviations that would be 
predicted from the linear specification. A similar nonlinear pattern emerges from the 
model 4 results for math, but the difference between the extremes is far smaller at 0.074 
standard deviations. For reading, all the effects are much smaller and any nonlinearities 
are hard to detect.   
  The third panel disaggregates the tests into two types, both of which changed 
form over time. One type is the basic elementary education test and the other is more 
content based. 
18  In addition to the variables reported in the table, we also included two 
indicator variables for whether or not a teacher took each of the tests.  The results are 
inconclusive in that they vary depending on the model. Model 4 suggests that the 
elementary education test is a better predictor of student achievement in both math and in 
reading.  According to the gains model, however, in math, the coefficient for the content 
test is slightly larger, although still indistinguishable from that for elementary education, 
and neither coefficient is distinguishable from zero for reading.  
Teacher experience  
  Though the positive results by years of teacher experience are clear and robust to 
various model specifications, the thorny issue remains of whether the rising returns to 
                                                 
18 Most teachers took only one test of each type but if they took more than one we averaged over the two 
tests. The first test is either the 0010 test or the 0011 test. The second is either the 0020 test or the 0012 test.    37
experience reflect improvement with experience or differentially higher attrition of the 
less effective teachers. In his study of 3 New Jersey school districts, Rockoff (2004) 
found that, even after including teacher fixed effects to control for the permanent 
characteristics of teachers, years of experience still emerged as a determinant of student 
achievement.  
We shed light on this issue by making use of information on teacher longevity as 
shown in Table 8.  Specifically, we have added to models 4 and 5, an indicator variable 
for whether or not the teacher remains a North Carolina teacher for at least three years 
and an interaction term between that variable and the indicator variable for 1-2 years of 
experience.
19 The negative coefficients of –0.019 and –0.033  on the indicator variable in 
the math equations suggests that the teachers who stay may be less effective on average 
than the ones who leave, a finding that is inconsistent with the differential attrition 
explanation for the rising returns to experience.  Moreover, the fact that the interaction 
terms, in both the math and the reading equations, are not statistically significant suggests 
that differential attrition does not generate upward biased estimates of the returns to 
experience in the early years of teaching. Hence, we conclude that the returns to 
education that emerge from our basic model are primarily attributable to learning from 
experience.
20   
                                                 
19 For this analysis  we have deleted from the full sample any students taught in a particular year by any 
recent young teacher  for whom we do not yet have enough information to determine whether they remain a 
North Carolina teacher for at least three years.  
20. We have not tried to add teacher fixed effects to any of our models that include either school or student 
fixed effects, largely because of the technical difficulties of doing so. We have, however, included teacher 
fixed effects in model 1. Consistent with the findings from the other test described in the text, we find that 
the new coefficients for the teacher experience variables increase slightly (and range from 0.069 for 1-2 
years of experience to 0.135 for 21-27 years of experience) for math once the teacher  fixed effects are 
included and a similar pattern emerges for reading (with the new coefficients ranging from 0.043 to a 
maximum of 0.101).     38
VI. Conclusion  
  As we noted earlier, the basic approach of the paper is not new. In fact, it is the 
approach used in a large number of papers in the tradition of education production 
functions. What differentiates this paper from other work is the richness and coverage of 
the administrative data on which the analysis is based. To our knowledge, no other 
statewide data base allows the matching of students with their specific teachers The 
availability of longitudinal data allows us to use student fixed effects which helps to 
minimize the statistical problems that have plagued much of the previous work on teacher 
credentials. 
Our findings for the experience variables are fully consistent with those of other 
studies, including our own previous cross sectional analysis. In particular, close to half 
the achievement returns to experience arise during the first few years of teaching but 
returns continue to rise throughout most of the experience range. Furthermore it appears 
that all of the returns are attributable to experience per se rather than to differential rates 
of attrition between more or less effective teachers.  In addition to the findings for 
experience, we also document that the state’s licensure tests provide policy relevant 
information, especially with respect to the teaching of math; that the form of licensure 
matters; that the National Board Certification process appears to identify effective 
teachers but does not make them more effective; and that master’s degrees obtained after 
5 years of teaching are associated with negative effects on student achievement.   
Taken together the various teacher credentials appear to have quite large effects 
on math achievement, whether compared to the effects of changes in class size or to the 
socio-economics characteristics of students, as measured, for example, by the education   39
level of their parents. The effects of teacher credentials on reading achievement are 
noticeably smaller, especially relative to the effects of family background.  Thus, even 
highly credentialed teachers are not likely to offset the effects of educationally 
impoverished family backgrounds on student achievement in reading. For math, however, 
the results are potentially more optimistic. The real challenge for policy makers is to find 
ways to direct the teachers with strong credentials to the students who most need them.      
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Table 1: Proportions of all students with test scores for whom we can match math 
and reading teachers, by grade and by year.  
 
See text for the matching criteria. Test score records are missing for 5
th grade students in 
1996. See appendix table A1 for the total number of student records available for the 
same grades and years.  
Math            
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
3
rd  .828 .747 .821 .833 .838 .857 .862 .833 .814 .799 
4
th  .802 .742 .811 .805 .827 .844 .848 .817 .800 .781 
5
th  .772  *  .792 .790 .807 .814 .827 .807 .784 .773 
Reading            
3
rd  .827 .750 .821 .831 .838 .857 .860 .831 .815 .799 
4
th  .811 .735 .814 .808 .833 .851 .855 .823 .808 .787 
5
th  .789  *  .799 .794 .811 .821 .834 .810 .801 .785   43
 
Table 2. Achievement models for math 
a 
  (1) 
Levels  

































Student  FE 
4th
  and 5
th 
graders 
Student characteristics that 
are constant over time 
b  Yes Yes Yes No  No 
Student characteristics that 
vary over time 
b  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Lagged math score  0.071** 
(0.004) 
0.704** 
































































No experience (base)   --  --  --  --  -- 




























































Regular license (base)   --  --  --  --  -- 





























































































































Percent college grad (base)   --  --  --  --  -- 




































R-squared    0.7150 0.7232 0.0683 0.9062 0.5021 
Observations   1,089,132 1,089,132  1,089,132 1,805,638 1,089,503 
Notes. 
a. Based on a panel data set of 3
rd, 4
th and 5
th graders from 1995 to 2004. Dependent 
variable is student achievement in each year. FE stands for fixed effect; Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses; ** signifies statistical significance at the 0.01 level and * at the 
0.05 level.  
b. The coefficients and standard errors for these variables are in appendix table 2.  
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Table 3. Achievement models for reading 
a 
  (1) 
Levels  

































Student  FE 
4th
  and 5
th 
graders 
Student characteristics that 
are constant over time 
b  Yes Yes Yes No  No 
Student characteristics that 
vary over time 
b  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Lagged reading score  0.683** 
(0.002) 
0.679** 
































































No experience (base)    --  --  --  --  -- 




























































Regular license (base)  --  --  --  --  -- 










Interact continuing/lateral  -0.022 -0.008 -0.022 -0.019 -0.021   46
entry (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012) (0.012) (0.023) 






























Undergrade institution   








































































Percent college grad (base)  --  --  --  --  -- 




































R  squared  0.6851 0.6885 0.0432 0.8969 0.4862 
Observations  1,096,478 1,096,478 1,096,516 1,814,704 1,096,724 
Notes. 
a. a. Based on a panel data set of 3
rd, 4
th and 5
th graders from 1995 to 2004. Dependent 
variable is student achievement in each year. FE stands for fixed effect; Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses; ** signifies statistical significance at the 0.01 level and * at the 
0.05 level.  
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Table 4. Effects on achievement: subject teacher vs. baseline teacher   
 
 
Difference in achievement 




Baseline teacher  
 
Subject teacher 
(weak credentials)  
          Math  
   low           high  
   Reading  
 low          high  




undergraduate college  
-0.007       -0.010      *           * 
Regular license  Other license  -0.033       -0.059  -0.017    -0.024 
Licensure test score is 
average  
Licensure test is 1 SD 
below the average 
 
-0.011       -0.015 
 
-0.003    -0.004 
Graduate degree  No graduate degree      *                 *  +0.004   +0.008 
National Board 
Certified  
Not National Board 
Certified  
-0.020        -0.028  -0.012    -0.012 
Total difference     -0.150        -0.206  -0.081      -0.120 
a. Lower bound estimates are from model 4 and upper bound estimates are from 
model 5 in Tables 3 and 4.   
*signifies coefficient is not statistically significant  
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Table 5. Achievement effects of graduate degrees
a 
  Model 4  Model 5 
  Math   Reading   Math   Reading 












by degree  
    





























































a. The entries in the first row are identical those reported for graduate degree in Tables 2 
and 3 for models 4 and 5. Subsequent entries are based on those same full models but 
with the graduate degree variable replaced first by the three disaggregated degree 
variables and then by the three master’s-by-time variables. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses; ** signifies the coefficient is statistically significant at the 0.01 level and * 
at the 0.05 level.  
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Table 6. National Board Certification  
  Model 4  Model 5 
  Math   Reading   Math   Reading 

































These results are based on the full models reported in Tables 2 and 3 with the NBCT 
variable in those equations replaced by the four NBCT variables listed here. NBCT-2  
(or –1) takes on the value 1 for two years (or 1 year) before the teacher is certified. 
NBCTcurrent takes on the value 1 for a teacher the year she is certified. NBCT post 
takes on the value 1 for any year after a teacher is certified.. Robust standard errors are 
in parentheses; ** signifies the coefficient is statistically significant at the 0.01 level and 
* at the 0.05 level.  
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Table 7.  Teacher test scores
a 
  Model 4 (levels)  Model 5 (gains) 
Basic model   Math Reading Math Reading 










score (SDs)  
    






















0.009      
(0.006) 








-0.5 to 0.5 
(base) 
-- -- -- -- 
































Test scores by 
type  
    

















a. The entries in the first row are identical those reported for test scores in Tables 2 and 3 
for models 4 and 5. Subsequent entries are based on those same full models but with the 
single variable replaced first by the series of indicator variables and then by the two types 
of tests. Robust standard errors are in parentheses;** signifies the coefficient is 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level and * at the 0.05 level.  
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Table 8. Teacher experience 
a 
  Model 4   Model 5  
  Math  Reading   Math   Reading  
With interactions  
Teacher will 



















years with stay 









a. Based on the full models reported for model  4 and 5 in Tables 2 (math) and 3 
(reading), with the sample modified to test scores for students taught by recent young 
teachers for whom we do not have information on whether they remained in teaching for 
3 or more years. . Robust standard errors are in parentheses; ** signifies coefficient is 
significant at the 0.01 level and * at the 0.05 level.  
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Table A1:  Number of students with math and reading scores, grades 3-5, 1995-2004. 
 
*test score records are missing for 5








Math            
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
3
rd  88,901  90,505  94,  872  98,838  101,006 101,585 102,152 100,732 102,543 101,747 
4
th  88,227 89,174 91,416 94,492 98,398  100,003  100,394  101,095  100,683  103,059 
5
th  86,146 * 90,250  91,917  95,240  98,562  100,219  101,121  103,864  102,656 
Reading            
3
rd  88,820  90,444  94,614  98,383  100,509 101,075 101,635 100,090 102,119 101,303 
4
th  88,161 89,168 91,223 94,102 97,918 99,460 99,715  100,399  100,284  102,580 
5
th  88,136  *  90,092 91,557 94,776 98,101 99,630  100,291  103,431  102,174   53
 
Table A2. Student characteristics for math achievement models 
a 
  (1) 
Levels  

































Student  FE 
4th





















(0.004)  -- -- 





(0.004)  -- -- 





(0.000)  -- -- 
Parents are college graduates  base 







(0.001)  -- -- 







(0.003)  -- -- 











(0.002)  -- -- 





(0.002)  -- -- 





(0.001)  -- -- 






























Lagged math score  0.710** 
(0.002) 
0.704** 
(0.002)  -- -- -- 
aSee Table 2 for the full set of variables in this model.   54
 
 
Table A3. Student characteristics for reading achievement models 
a 
  (1) 
Levels  

































Student  FE 
4





















(0.004)  -- -- 





(0.004)  -- -- 





(0.000)  -- -- 
Parents are college 
graduates  base 







(0.002)  -- -- 







(0.003)  -- -- 











(0.002)  -- -- 





(0.002)  -- -- 





(0.002)  -- -- 






























Lagged reading score  0.683** 
(0.002) 
0.679** 
(0.002)  -- -- -- 
a.See Table 3 for the full set of variables in this equation. 